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Abstract 
This paper assesses the impact of the early 1980s neoliberalistic reform strategies in 
urban water distribution in developing countries. It examines in particular, the technical 
efficiency of two heterogeneous urban water utility-groups in Uganda. Performance is 
considered in light of the key urban water sector objectives that are to universally 
increase qualitative water coverage and enhance utility revenue. Using a two-staged 
bias-corrected metafrontier based on the data envelopment analysis estimators, the 
public-private (than the public-public) owned utilities are found less efficient. 
Efficiency differences between both groups are further linked to utilities scale of 
operation and market capture capabilities among other factors. The paper urges policy 
makers to strengthen public sector capabilities as a development policy solution for 
inclusive quality water services access among other basic public utility services in 
Uganda, Africa and the developing countries in general. 
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1 Introduction 
Safe drinking water access in Africa remains a key developmental issue. Sub-Saharan Africa 
and Oceania regions are particularly lagging behind their millennium development target of 
halving the population without access to safe drinking water by 2015 (UNESCO and 
Earthscan, 2009). This exceptional gap in safe water coverage calls for strengthened 
infrastructure development but firstly, water provider’s efficiency advancement. 
 
In overcoming water service providers’ (hereafter water utilities i.e., WUs) technical 
inefficiency reflected in low revenue collection, declined (re)investments and limited quality 
water coverage, the government of Uganda embarked on a number of organizational and 
institutional sector reforms in the late 1990s (MWLE, 2001). Sector investment and 
development plans for the rural water supply, urban water supply, water resource 
management and water for production were designed and endorsed (MWLE, 2000: 2001: 
2005a: 2005b). Among other strategies, the urban water supply sector reforms advanced 
increased private sector participation in infrastructure development and service provision as 
well as, universal safe water coverage with sufficient cost recovery (MWLE, 2001). This 
study focuses on the urban water sector that consists of both large and small town’s WUs.  
 
Following the neoliberalistic urban water sector reforms, service provision mandate for 
gazetted large and small  urban towns was delegated respectively,  to  the National  Water  and 
Sewerage Corporation (hereafter, NWSC) and the local governments (MWLE, 2001). Both 
NWSC and the local governments (i) sign a renewable three year performance contract with 
the government (Ministry of Water and Environment, hereafter, MWE), (ii) own respective 
water distribution assets on behalf of the government and (iii) engage self-procured WUs 
through renewable management contracts,3 to supply water on their behalf across towns under 
their mandate (MWLE, 2001).4  Nonetheless, WUs under NWSC’s oversight are publicly 
owned while those under the local governments are privately owned as provided respectively, 
by the NWSC Act Cap 317 (RoU, 1995) and the Local Government Act, Cap 243 (RoU, 
2008). The MWE regulates and provides technical support to all urban WUs in Uganda 
(MWLE, 2008). Regulation is based on prior agreed partial performance indicators provided 
in the respective management contracts. 
 
In advancing universal safe water coverage for all urban population in Uganda as provided by 
the National  Water  Policy (MWLE, 1999),  it  is  important  to  examine the influence of  these 
                                               
3 Short term management contracts than long-term concession arrangements (i) permit regular competitive bidding 
that helps improve WUs operational efficiency and, (ii) are less prone to future renegotiation risks among other 
contract incompleteness-related problems (Seppala, et al., 2001).  
4  Following Bayliss (2003), unbundling asset ownership from services provision not only permits improved 
transparency and accountability but isolates also, operation areas that are easy to privatize. 
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differently advanced managerial ownership types on WU’s technical efficiency. Normally, 
traditional production frontier models (parametric or non-parametric) are used to link 
observed output production to some optimal production defined by the best-practice frontier 
(Fried, et al., 2008). This is particularly the case when observed firms (or groups of firms) are 
homogenous in nature (e.g., in terms of technology use). However, urban WU-groups in 
Uganda are heterogeneous with respect to their managerial ownership and inherently, their 
scales of operation. This implicitly implies that production frontier differences between both 
WU-groups are inherently influenced by the existing managerial ownership arrangement.  
 
We use the metafrontier technique based on the Data Envelopment Analysis (hereafter, DEA) 
estimators (Rao, et al., 2003; O’Donnell, et  al.,  2007). The technique allows the study to 
estimate first, specific utilities distance to the specific group frontier (technical efficiency 
measure) and second, specific group frontier’s distance to the best-practice technology 
available across the urban water supply sector (defined by the metafrontier). This allows us to 
capture (i) WUs technical efficiency (relative to specific group frontier) and (ii) technology 
differences (gaps) between WU-groups while taking into account any utilities heterogeneity.  
 
Despite their advantages over econometric frontier techniques, two-stage DEA estimators 
face several statistical limitations including serial correlation (especially in finite samples) of 
estimated efficiencies. This results in incorrect and misleading estimates. To overcome these 
limitations, the two-stage double bootstrap truncated regression technique (Simar and Wilson, 
2007) is used. The technique permits the study to extend the deterministic metafrontier 
technique and allow for consistent inferencing while controlling for any data noise impacts. 
This  further  allows  us  to  examine  whether  WUs’  efficiency  is  different  across  the  distinct  
managerial ownership arrangements and more so, whether other utility and sector specific 
environmental factors explain group’s efficiency differences.  
 
Through the rest parts of the paper, WUs under NWSC are referred to as public-public owned 
while those under the local governments are referred to as public-private owned. Managerial 
ownership is defined as the transfer by the government of service provision responsibilities 
through management contracts. Safe water coverage is defined to include mainly piped water 
supplies within 200 meters from observed households (MWLE, 2006: 2007). Self-collected 
operational data from urban WUs across both groups over a three-year period (2005-2007) is 
used. In Uganda alike other utilities across the developing world, technical inefficiency is 
reflected in terms of market penetration constraints (service coverage gaps) owing to limited 
revenue collection and reinvestment among other factors. These restrain staff capacity 
advancement and regular mains maintenance works among other aspects, resulting for 
example, in increased non-revenue water (NRW). Between 2004 and 2007, about 21 percent 
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of the distributed water was lost on average across the public-public owned (17 percent) and 
the public-private owned (25 percent) WUs in Uganda (MWLE, 2007). 
 
Limited systematic country productivity assessments given the sector reforms exists across 
the African region (see Annex 1), largely owing to inexistent or/and inconsistent utility 
operational data constraints (Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2005). Accessibility of specific country 
data, in this case, from the Ugandan urban water sector, allows valuable within-country 
analyses. These provide useful insights in the design of future restructuring policy strategies 
especially,  across  the African region.  Since the late  1990s when the MWE initiated reforms 
across the urban water sector in Uganda, limited performance analyses that incorporate the 
sector’s complexity (in terms of multiple-input use and multi-output production), exist. 
Available annual performance assessment reports use partial than multidimensional 
performance indicators such as, the share of people with or without access to safe water 
systems (see MWLE, 2006: 2007: 2008). This study attempts to bridge these gaps. Resultant 
findings will help utility managers and sector regulators to objectively identify scopes for 
improving specific WUs performance as well as, the entire urban water supply sector within 
existing technological constraints. 
 
The following section explores the role of managerial ownership on WUs performance. 
Section three develops the analytical framework while section four describes the Ugandan 
water sector. The empirical methodology and data used for the study are defined in section 
five. Section six and seven provides the study results and conclusion, respectively.    
 
 
2 Managerial ownership and water utilities performance  
 
Common to the 1990s restructuring programmes rolled out across most infrastructural public 
utilities (including electricity, gas, telecommunications and water supply utilities) in the 
developing economies in particular, is the change in the ownership of assets and management 
of service provision rights (Seppala, et al., 2001; Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2005; Boubakri, et 
al., 2008). However, both publicly and privately owned utilities  differ  in  a  number  of  ways  
that potentially influence their performance. Governments (tax-payers through for example, 
public companies or corporations) own public utilities while private shareholders own private 
utilities. Government’s control over the means of production and service delivery (through 
input prices for example) guarantees (or it is meant to guarantee) inclusive quality services 
provision (optimized social welfare). This is particularly relevant for the urban water supply 
industry that is geographically monopolistic, characterized by high initial investment sunk 
costs, and hardly competitive (due to the non-detachability of water production and 
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distribution networks within a specific service area) in nature (Waterson, 1988; Seppala, et 
al., 2001; Joskow, 2007; Spronk, 2010).  
 
Nonetheless, direct government control and subsidization of state-owned utilities results in 
unwarranted cost overruns owing to weak budget oversights, conflicting trade union interests 
and the inexistence of market take-over risks in case of bankruptcy (Boubakri, et al., 2008; 
Marques, 2008; Lin, et al., 2009). Coupled with public utility property right’s non-
transferability (Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978) in addition other inefficiencies due to public 
choice and principal-agent problems (see Byrnes, 1985; Vining and Boardman, 1992), public 
ownership lends itself to attenuated activities specialization, foresightedness and 
innovativeness (Tisdell and Hartley, 2008). 
 
Private utility managers face persistent pursuit for profits with limited multi-tasking and free-
riding problems (Seppala, et al., 2001; Anwandter and Ozuna, 2002). This pursuit for profits 
coupled with depoliticized shareholder performance-based monitoring results in improved 
resource allocation efficiency, innovativeness and responsiveness to consumer demands 
(Tisdell and Hartley, 2008; Spronk, 2010).  
 
Literature counts a number of empirical studies that found privately (than publicly) owned 
urban WUs more efficient (Crain and Zardkoohi, 1978: 1980; Raffiee, et al., 1993; 
Bhattacharyya, et al., 1995; Estache and Rossi, 2002; Bitran and Valenzuela, 2003; Moreira, 
et al., 2005; Andrés, et al., 2008; Gassner, et al., 2009; Picazo-Tadeo, et al., 2009; Correia 
and Marques, 2011). Compared to publicly owned urban WUs, privately owned utilities were 
found more cost effective, responsive to costumer demands, less corrupt, well governed and 
more likely to exploit possible scale, scope and costumer density economies (see Annex 1).   
 
Nonetheless, private (than public) urban WU ownership is often flawed by increased 
information asymmetry, exclusive service provision, operations downsizing and increased 
output prices with minimal capital investments among other problems (see Lynk, 1993; 
Bhattacharyya, et al., 1994; Shaoul, 1997; Saal and Parker, 2000: 2001; Estache and Trujillo, 
2003; Saal, et al., 2007; Marques, 2008; Souza, et al., 2008, see Annex 1). This reduces 
services quality and customer satisfaction (Seppala, et al., 2001). Besides, a few empirical 
studies found no significant differences between privately and publicly owned urban WUs in 
both developed and developing countries (see Feigenbaum, et al., 1983; Hausman, et al., 
1986; Byrnes, et al., 1986; Teeples and Glyer, 1987; Lambert, et al., 1993; Estache and Rossi, 
2002; Saal and Parker, 2004; Kirkpatrick, et al., 2006; Souza, et al., 2007).  
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Earlier studies on the role of ownership on urban WUs’ performance use different approaches 
(mainly parametric) based on a priori defined assumptions and provide mixed evidence. The 
increasingly inconclusive debate since the 1970s coupled with the imperfectly contestable 
urban water market (Vining and Boardman, 1992) reflects the continued relevance of the 
issue. This is true for most African countries that are presently implementing (e.g. Cote 
d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Mozambique, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia) 
or in the process of initiating (e.g., Democratic Republic of Congo) neoliberalistic reform 
programmes in their urban water sectors (ECA, 2005; AMCW et al., 2006; Osumanu, 2008). 
Key to these water reform programmes is the advancement of private sector participation in 
services delivery - a highly debated political issue. This paper provides new evidence on the 
role of service provision ownership on urban WUs technical efficiency with the use of bias-
corrected non-parametric techniques.  
 
 
3 Analytical framework  
 
DEA takes into account most service sectors complexity in terms of multi-input utilization to 
produce multi-outputs. It estimates efficiency scalars based on external rather than average 
values (Fried, et al., 2008). While the deterministic approach compares favourably with 
econometric approaches (Chalos and Cherian, 1995), it nevertheless avoids a priori 
production function specifications. The metafrontier technique (Rao, et al., 2003; O’Donnell, 
et al., 2007) in particular, permits efficiency measurements across more that one dissimilar 
groups relative to a common metafrontier.  
 
Metafrontier is defined as the boundary of an unrestricted technology set that envelopes 
observed group frontiers. This allows for the estimation of (i) individual utilities’ technical 
efficiency relative to the individual’s best-practice group frontier derived from each group’s 
observations, and (ii) specific group’s technology gaps relative to the metafrontier (reflecting 
the overall available technology accessible across observed groups). Technical efficiency 
estimates represent the ratio of the minimal inputs required to the actual inputs used given a 
certain output level (resource saving objective) or, the ratio of the maximal achievable outputs 
to the actual attained output given a certain input mix (service-expanding objective) (Fried, et 
al., 2008). They (technical efficiency estimates) help inform performance improvement 
designs within and across observed groups.  
 
Both WU-groups observed in this study share similar water distribution technology. They 
distribute potable water through piped network systems (MWLE, 2006: 2007). Nonetheless, 
they differ in two main aspects that potentially influence their resource usage among other 
choices. Firstly, they differ in their managerial ownership nature. Secondly, they operate 
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under different scales. In 2006 for example, the public-public owned utilities served about 
1,669,182 (out of a total of 2,384,546) population with piped water systems within their 
licensed jurisdiction. The public-private owned utilities on the other hand, served estimated 
451,823 (out of a total of 996,335) persons with piped water systems within their licensed 
jurisdiction. There existed in 2006 a total of 18 (public-public) and 71 (public-private) urban 
towns (utilities) with functional piped water systems in Uganda (MWLE, 2006). The paper at 
hand uses the managerial ownership dummy variable under variable return to scale (hereafter, 
VRS) assumption, to capture any unobserved structural disparities due to differences in 
ownership structure that is fixed for each firm in the same group (Bhattacharyya, et al., 1995).  
 
A metatechnology set  MFT  is associated with technologically feasible input and output sets 
based on non-negative input  x  and output  y  vectors of the dimension 1uM  and 1uN  
respectively.  
 
 ^ `yproducecanxyxyxTMF ;0;0:, tt                                               [1] 
 
 
In the case of the urban water sector in most developing countries, demand for improved 
water services remains unmatched by WUs. More so, owing to the performance-based 
regulation arrangements following the urban sector reforms, utilities limitedly alter their input 
mixes including capital stock (i.e., often fixed at least in the short-term) and preset tariffs but 
have the liberty to change their output mixes. Such allows them attain a priori set performance 
targets with sufficient cost-recovery (Estache and Rossi, 2002). We thus, adopt an output 
oriented technological specification. To estimate technical efficiency  MFT  across utility 
groups, an output metadistance function  ^ `yxDoMF ,  is defined (on the output set representing 
the metafrontier technology set) as:  
 
     ^ `xPyyxD MFMFMFoMF MF ! TTT :0inf,                                                     [2] 
 
 
where  yxDMF ,  is the maximal radial expansion of unit outputs given existing input 
resources.  xPMF  is the output set defined for any input vector as 
   ^ `MFMF TyxyxP  ,:  while, ‘inf’ stands for ‘infimum5’.  
 
 
                                               
5 It allows for the possibility that the minimum may not exist. That is,  MFT = +f  is possible (see Coelli, et al., 
2005). 
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In the absence of price information (input costs and/or output revenue), distance functions 
permit the specification of multiple-input and multiple-output technology sets (Coelli and 
Perelman, 1999).  Under an output-oriented assumption, estimated distance functions are by 
nature non-decreasing in y, decreasing in x, linearly homogenous in y and convex in y (Coelli, 
et al., 2005). Relative to the metafrontier, a given utility  yx,  is technically efficient if the 
output metadistance function equals unity. This implies that it is located on the outer 
boundary of the production possibility set.  
 
To further estimate individual utility’s technical efficiency scores relative to each group’s 
best-practice frontier, an nth group-specific technology set  nGFT  is defined and represented in 
terms of its group-specific distance function  ^ `yxDnGF ,  as: 
 
 ^ `yproducetongroupinWUsbyusedbecanxyxyxT nGF ;0;0:, tt      [3] 
 
 
         ^ ` NnxPyyxD nGFnGFnGFnGF nGF ...3,2,1,:0inf,  ! TTT                                   [4] 
 
where  xP nGF  represents the group specific output set whose boundaries define the group 
frontier.    ^ ` NnTyxyxP nGFnGF ...3,2,1,,:   . WU i is technically efficient relative to 
its group best-practice frontier if its group specific distance function is equal to one. The 
technical efficiency score of a given WU  n
GFi
TE  is thus related to the distance, computed 
relative to the group frontier  nGFnGF ii DTE  .  
 
Figure 1 provides an illustration of a convex metafrontier ABCDEF6 that envelopes group 11’ 
and 22’ frontiers. The distance between the metafrontier ( NMFD ) and either group’s frontiers 
( nGFD ) provides a measure of the technology gap ratio (DMTR). The farther a specific group’s 
average efficiency is to one, the farther (in terms of output production) to the maximum 
potential output given the technology available across the urban water sector, WUs within the 
specific group are.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
6 Non-convexity assumption (resulting for e.g., in A-B-C-q-1’, in figure 1) results to higher group efficiency and 
technology-gap ratio estimates, relative to the metafrontier (O’Donnell, et al., 2007). 
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Figure 1: Metafrontier technique illustration* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Technology gap (DMTR) measures the ratio of group-n’s output (defined by the best-practice 
group frontier) relative to the potentially attainable output defined by the metafrontier, given 
observed input units. The technology gap for the public-private owned utility group is for 
example computed as (Rao, et al., 2003; O’Donnell, et al., 2007):  
 
 
                                                        [5] 
 
 
The two stage double bootstrap truncated regression technique (see Simar and Wilson, 2007)  
based on the DEA efficiency estimators is used to construct both group frontiers and the 
metafrontier (by pooling all groups observations). DEA VRS considers the following 
optimization problem (that is solved for each observation) for N firms (i = 1,2,3…N) in T 
periods (t = 1, 2, 3… T): 
 
itit OI ,
max       I it                                                                                          [6] 
  subject to: I it  yit   -   YO it    0, 
    XO it       -   x it      0, 
  and   O it    0;   1 ¦ itO  
 
   yxDyxDyxMTR PprGFPprMFPpr ,,),(  
* For a utility producing unit output with unit input. An output orientation under VRS is assumed.  
Source: Authors illustration 
2’= GF, Group 2 
1’= GF, Group 1 
MF 
F E 
q 
D 
DMF DMTR 
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P2 
X 2 1 A 
B 
C 
Y 
O 
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where I it  is  a  scalar  that  provides  information  on  the  nth utility’s technical efficiency 
estimates in the tth period. yit is a M x 1 vector of output quantities for the ith firm  in  the  tth 
period. Y is the M x Ln T matrix of output quantities for all Ln firms in all T periods and O it 
the Ln T x 1 vector of non-negative weights.  X is the Q x LnT vector of input quantities for all 
Ln firms in all T periods while x it is  the  Q x 1 vector of input quantities for the ith firm in 
period t. 1 ¦ itO  imposes VRS to the linear program while 1/I it gives the output-oriented 
technical efficiency estimates of either the group frontier (s) or, the metafrontier.  
  
 
 
4 The Ugandan water sector 
 
Unlike many African countries, Uganda is relatively well endowed with adequate water 
resources. The country has a mean annual rainfall of 1300 millimetres (mm) that ranges from 
100  mm  in  the  semi-arid  parts  of  Karamoja  to  3000  mm  in  the  Northeastern  region  (UN-
Water and WWAP, 2006). Uganda’s renewable water resource is estimated at 66 km3per year. 
By 2007, this was equivalent to about 1412 cubic meters per inhabitant per year (m3/inh/y) 
annual internal renewable water resources. This endowment exceeds by far internal renewable 
fresh water resources in some (30 percent) African countries with quantities below 1000 
m3/inh/y including, Algeria (342 m3/inh/y), Burkina Faso (906 m3/inh/y), Egypt (24 
m3/inh/y), Libya (104 m3/inh/y), Kenya (630 m3/inh/y) and Tunisia (418 m3/inh/y) (AfDB, 
2010). Prominent fresh water reservoirs in Africa including the Nile basin (the world’s 
longest); rivers Ruizi, Katonga, Kafu, Mpologoma and Aswa; and lakes Kyoga, Albert, 
George, Edward and Victoria (the world’s second largest freshwater lake, and the source of 
the  River  Nile)  pass  through  or  are  found  in  Uganda  (UN-Water  and  WWAP,  2006).  
Consequently, 82 percent of the country’s land is arable (UN-Water and WWAP, 2006). 
 
More than 40 percent of the urban population (about 1.7 million out a total of 4.4 million 
urban residents) lacks access to improved water supply systems (MWLE, 2008). The number 
is projected to rise with increased urbanization and population growth rates, among other 
factors. More so, sewerage service provision remains an enormous challenge constrained by 
low infrastructural development. By 2007, only about 10 percent of the population living in 
the large urban towns was served with improved sewerage services (Mugisha, 2007). While 
improved sewerage service provision is equally indispensable for a healthy productive 
population, this paper focuses only on improved water supply provision.   
 
Besides catchment-level institutions that protect fresh water reservoirs, WUs constitute a 
major actor in sustainable water resource and supply management. They invest in 
infrastructural development including the construction and maintenance of dams, treatment 
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plants, storage tanks, desalination and recycling systems and distribution piped network 
systems. Infrastructural investment not only ensures sustained quality services delivery but 
guarantees water resources sustainability against inevitable water shortages from seasonal and 
sometimes shared surface and underground water catchments. 
 
 
5 Empirical specification and data 
Water distribution technology across the Ugandan urban water sector is described, in the 
current analysis, in terms of one input; operational expenditures and two outputs; the 
volumetric  amount  of  water  sold  and  the  number  of  served  population  with  piped  water  
systems (i.e., within utilities’ licensed jurisdiction). Volumetric water sold than the total 
amount of water supplied from the production sites was preferred for two main reasons. 
Firstly, to adequately collect revenue with minimal (or no) water losses, utilities have to 
employ more field employees and consequently, incur higher network maintenance costs 
reflected in their operating expenses. In such case, the amount of water sold reflects better the 
input requirement. Secondly, to distribute water, utilities with higher water losses reflected 
also in reduced revenue collections could appear efficient due to their low input use 
(operating expenses). In such case, the amount of water sold provides a better output indicator 
that takes into account also, any water losses (non-revenue water). To attain universal quality 
water services coverage for all urban customers in Uganda, WUs need to strengthen their 
revenue collection for reinvestment in increased piped water provision.  
 
Taking into account yearly inflation and deflation, GDP price deflators were used to convert 
utilities operational expenditures (measured in current prices) into constant-dollar GDP 
measures. Unlike other price indices including the Consumer Price Index, GDP price deflators 
reflect annual changes in country consumption and investment patterns. The use of utilities 
operational expenditures allows the study to capture also managerial malfunctions reflected in 
inefficient resource utilization among other corrupt practices. To explain efficiency 
differences between the two utility groups, the study takes into account utilities (i) target 
population over total active water connections share and (ii) managerial ownership structure.  
 
Operational data from 27 urban WUs (10 public-public owned, 17 public-private owned) in 
Uganda  is  used.  The  sample  represents  more  than  23  percent  of  the  total  urban  WUs  in  
Uganda (by 2007). While the data is limited (lacks in particular output revenue information), 
it permits consistent technical efficiency estimation and comparison across both WU-groups 
between 2005 and 2007. The short analysis period allows the study to assume minimal (or no) 
technological change across observed utilities.  
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Data for both groups was first sourced from the sector’s annual reports available online. 
However, to cross-check the validity of gathered information and fill-in missing information 
gaps,  a  field visit  to  Uganda was necessary by the end of  2008.   This  allowed access  of  the 
internal management information systems of the Directorate of Water Development (of the 
MWE) and NWSC, by the authors. Both information depositories capture and store centrally 
operational information for the public-private owned and the public-public owned WUs, 
respectively.  
 
Table 1 provides some summary statistics of the different input, output and environmental 
variables used for the study between 2005 and 2007. Over the three years, the public-public 
owned urban WUs expensed about five million Ugandan shillings more than the public-
private owned utilities. Consequently, the public-public owned utilities increased their piped 
water connections serving more persons on average than the public-private owned utilities. 
The latter utilities covered (with piped water systems) about twenty six thousand less 
customers. Compared to the public-private owned utilities, the public-public owned utilities 
managed to penetrate better their urban water markets (within their licensed jurisdiction) and 
meet much of the existing demand for quality water services. This is reflected in their lower 
share  of  target  population  per  total  water  connections  (see  Table  1).  Moreover,  the  public-
public owned utilities made more collections than the public-private owned utilities. The 
former utilities sold on average eleven thousand more cubic meters of water than the public-
private owned utilities (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1:   Input, output and environmental variables summary statistic  
 Group Obs Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Input variable 
Public-public 30 49054899 22114458 24076000 98396000 
Public-private 51 43514117 26801008 7760589 155864768 
Operational 
expenditures* 
All 81 45566258 25168687 7760589 155864768 
Output variables      
 
 
Public-public 30 53131 27054 16346 119500 
Public-private 51 42004 22509 12251 99224 
Volumetric water sold 
(cubic meters) 
All 81 46125 24723 12251 119500 
       
Public-public 30 38789 20704 9727 94669 
Public-private 51 11820 4684 3144 27684 
Served population 
with piped water 
(persons) All 81 21809 18462 3144 94669 
       
Environmental variables 
Public-public 30 1 0 1 1 
Public-private 51 0 0 0 0 
Managerial ownership 
(dummy variable) 
All 81 0.37 0.49 0 1 
       
Public-public 30 20.30 6.43 12.81 37.46 
Public-private 51 57.99 50.30 14.26 316.95 
Target population over 
total water connections 
share All 81 44.03 43.95 12.81 316.95 
* GDP price deflated 
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6 Study results and discussion 
 
6.1 Efficiency and market organisation  
In light of the ‘service-expanding’ objective of the Ugandan urban water sector, like other 
water sectors across the developing nations in particular; technical inefficiency implies that 
specific utilities can potentially increase their output without changing their input levels 
relative to respective group and meta-frontiers. Table 2 provides the bias-corrected technical 
efficiency estimates relative to (i) specific group’s best practice frontier and (ii) the overall 
urban water distribution technology (metafrontier).  
 
On average, public-public owned utilities produced 78 percent of the potentially attainable 
output (given existing inputs) relative to the water distribution technology across the public-
public owned utilities. The public-private owned utilities on the other hand, produced on 
average about 64 percent of the potentially attainable output (given existing resources) 
relative to the public-private group’s best-practice frontier.  
 
In terms of the technology gap estimated by the metatechnology ratio (equation 5), the public-
public owned group frontier (0.83) than the public-private owned group frontier (0.74), is 
found much closer to the (convex) metafrontier. This implies that the public-private owned 
utilities operate under unfavourable environments (beyond utility managers control) 
compared to the public-public owned utilities. The latter utilities can at maximum attain about 
9 percent more output devoid of the restrictive operational environments (see Table 2). 
Consequently, the public-public owned utilities are found more technical efficient, relative to 
the overall urban water sector best practice frontier in Uganda. 
 
 
Table 2:  Bias-corrected technical efficiency estimates (DEA – VRS)* 
 Group frontier   Metafrontier  Metatechnology ratio (**) 
Group 
Public-
public 
Public-
private All  
Public- 
public 
Public- 
private All  
Public- 
public 
Public- 
private All 
Observations 30 51 81  30 51 81  30 51 81 
Mean 0.781 0.638 0.732  0.648 0.465 0.586  0.829 0.736 0.797 
Median 0.718 0.616 0.650  0.586 0.416 0.496  0.790 0.759 0.783 
Std. Dev. 0.176 0.211 0.211  0.173 0.196 0.199  0.128 0.239 0.205 
* Weighted by the total number of served population per utilities’ licensed jurisdiction. 
** Technical efficiency relative to metafrontier by technical efficiency relative to the group frontier ratio. 
 
 
 
This technology gap can be explained by the differently implemented regulatory framework 
within the urban water sector in Uganda. While utilities in both groups sign performance 
contracts with the government (MWE), the public-public owned  utilities  self-regulate  to  a  
large extent their operations, through the NWSC (see Muhairwe, 2009). Such internal 
monitoring potentially helps improve in particular, the public-public owned utilities’ technical 
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efficiency. This is evidenced by the shorter distance of the public-public owned group frontier 
to the overall best-practice metafrontier. The latter is computed in light of the key urban water 
sector objectives, that is, to increase piped drinking water coverage and concurrently, enhance 
collections (revenues).7  The private management flexibility, among other classical private 
sector traits, are found insufficiently relevant in advancing public-private owned utilities 
performance compared to utilities under public-public partnerships.  
 
Exploring utility efficiency estimates overtime provides further interesting trends. Public-
public owned utilities produced on average 25, 21 and 20 percent less output relative to their 
respective group frontiers in 2005, 2006 and 2007 (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Annual bias-corrected technical efficiency estimates* 
Group Period  Group Frontier Meta frontier Metatechnology ratio** 
Public-public 2005 Mean 0.751 0.620 0.826 
  Median 0.721 0.567 0.802 
 2006 Mean 0.790 0.663 0.835 
  Median 0.720 0.617 0.789 
 2007 Mean 0.798 0.659 0.826 
  Median 0.711 0.607 0.797 
      
Public-private 2005 Mean 0.651 0.426 0.656 
  Median 0.616 0.404 0.643 
 2006 Mean 0.593 0.466 0.777 
  Median 0.602 0.486 0.787 
 2007 Mean 0.658 0.509 0.794 
  Median 0.650 0.479 0.769 
* Weighted by the total number of served population per utilities’ licensed jurisdiction. 
** As defined earlier, see Table 1 
 
 
 
The public-private owned utilities produced on average 35, 41 and 34 percent less output 
(given existing inputs) relative to their respective group’s water distribution technology in 
2005, 2006 and 2007 (see Table 3). The technology gap declined overtime especially, for the 
public-private owned  utilities.  Their  group’s  best  practice  frontier  was  found  closer  to  the  
overall urban water sector metafrontier in 2007 than 2005. The public-public owned utilities’ 
best practice frontier was found 83, 84 and 83 percent closer to the urban water sector’s 
metafrontier in 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively. The public-private owned utilities’ group 
frontier was on the other hand found 66, 78 and 79 percent closer to the urban water sector’s 
metafrontier respectively in 2005, 2006 and 2007. While the public-private (compared to the 
public-public) owned utilities are in general found less technically efficient, their technology 
gap has indeed declined overtime. This can be explained, among other reasons, by the 
increased performance-based regulation across these utilities by the MWE, overtime (MWLE, 
2006: 2007: 2008).  
                                               
7 Taking into account other sector objectives like to increase the number of active water connections provided 
analogous estimates. This results are available upon request. 
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In determining WUs’ returns to scale nature, that is, relative to each group’s best-practice 
frontier, utilities technical efficiency measures under VRS assumption were compared to 
those estimated under non increasing returns to scale (hereafter, NIRS). For the latter 
estimates,  the  sum  of  weights  (in  equation  6)  were  restricted  to  less  than  or  equal  to  one  
( 1d¦ itO ).  Identical VRS and NIRS technical efficiency scores signify decreasing returns 
to scale operation while nonequivalent VRS and NIRS technical efficiency scores denote 
operation in an increasing return to scale region (Krasachat, 2003). 
 
The majority public-public owned  utilities  are  found  to  operate  under  a  DRS  region  while,  
most public-private owned WUs are found to operate  under  an IRS region (see Table 4).  In 
terms of the managerial ownership organization, 3 and 1 utilities are found to operate, 
overtime, under a DRS region for the public-public owned and the public-private owned 
WUs, respectively. More so, 2 and 5 WUs are found to operate overtime under an IRS region 
respectively, for the public-public owned and the public-private owned utilities. For the rest 
public-public owned, 2, 3 and 4 utilities operated under a DRS in 2005, 2006 and 2007, 
respectively. However, 3 (2005), 2 (2006) and 1 (2007) utilities were found to operate 
respectively, under an IRS region. On the contrary, 5, 6 and 9 utilities were found to operate 
under an IRS region for the public-private owned WUs in 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively. 
More over, 6 (2005), 5 (2006) and 2 (2007) WUs operated under a DRS region for the public-
private owned WU-group. 
 
 
Table 4: Utilities return to scale estimates 
Public-public owned water utilities Public-private owned water utilities 
UTILITY 2005 2006 2007 UTILITY 2005 2006 2007 
Arua D D D Adjumani D I D 
Bushenyi I I I Bugiri D I I 
FPortal I D D Busia I D I 
Kabale I D D Buwenge I I I 
Kasese I I I Kaliro I I I 
Lira D I I Kalisizo D D D 
Masaka D D D Kamuli I I I 
Mbale I D D Kapchorwa I I I 
Soroti D I D Kayunga I D I 
Tororo D D D Kiboga I I D 
    Kitgum I D I 
    Kumi D D I 
    Luwero D I I 
    Moyo I I I 
    Nakasongola D I I 
    Rukungiri D I I 
    Wobulenzi I D I 
I = increasing returns to scale, D =  decreasing returns to scale 
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In  terms  of  the  water  industry  market  characterization,  WUs  found  to  operate  under  a  DRS 
region have reached and exceeded their optimum water distribution capacity. That is in terms 
of attaining optimal service provision with existing resources. To accommodate potential 
growth in demand, these utilities could advance individual than shared piped water 
connections. Given the positive correlation between household income (as well as better 
education) and increased willingness and ability to connect to individual water connections 
(see Larson, et al., 2006), such would more over, reinforce cross-subsidized services to the 
low income customers. 
 
To universally extent services to the yet unserved population for WUs operating under IRS, 
increased investment in infrastructure and human development among other things is needed. 
This will allow effectiveness attainment in terms of water production and distribution mains 
expansion (to new customers) and maintenance (for existing customers) at affordable 
connection and user fees. More over, utilities could exploit possible customer density 
economies and benefit from increased collections for re-investment purposes.  
 
 
6.2 Efficiency determinants 
 
6.2.1 Managerial ownership  
To confirm further public-public owned WUs’ superiority (see section 6.1), the study 
explored in a second stage, managerial ownership influence on utilities technical efficiency. 
Indeed, public-public managerial ownership was found significantly and positively linked to 
increased utilities’ technical efficiency (see Table 5). The public-public than public-private 
service provision ownership type was associated with a 15 percent increase in utilities’ 
efficiency.  
 
This positive outcome attests the inherent links between efficiency and effectiveness. Indeed, 
to achieve a priori specified performance targets, (strongly) regulated utilities are motivated 
to improve their technical efficiency. Across the public-public (than the public-private) 
owned utilities in Uganda, exemplary performance is quarterly rewarded with bonuses, cash 
prizes, trophies and staff promotions (Muhairwe, 2009). Poorly performing WU managers 
(for more than 3 consecutive months) are demoted or laid off.  
 
6.2.2 Market capture 
To provide additional insights, WUs market capture trends were examined. Increasing the 
share of target population over the total active water connections was linked to declined 
utilities’ technical efficiency, though not significant (see Table 5). Increasing piped water 
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connections across specific WUs jurisdiction will likely reduce the unserved population and 
ultimately, increase utilities efficiency.  
 
 
Table 5:  Efficiency determinants  
Dependent variable: Bias-corrected technical efficiency estimates relative to the metafrontier 
 Parameter Standard deviation P-value 
Constant (N=81) 0.431 0.047 0.000(***) 
Managerial ownership (public-public = 1) 0.147 0.047 0.002(***) 
Share of target population over total water connections  -0.00009 0.001 0.895 
Sigma constant 0.190 0.016 0.000(***) 
 (***) statistically significant at all levels (10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively), N = observed sample size 
 
       
 
7 Conclusion 
 
Following the late 1990s neoliberalistic urban water sector reforms that advanced in particular 
increased private sector participation in water service provision, two managerial ownership 
structures emerged in Uganda; the public-public and the public-private. Using a two-stage 
double bootstrap truncated regression metafrontier technique; this paper examined first, 
technical efficiency differences of and technology gaps between two heterogeneous urban 
WU-groups in Uganda. Secondly, the paper explored whether WUs’ technical efficiency is 
significantly different across both WU-groups and whether other utility and sector specific 
environmental factors explain WU-group’s technical efficiency differences. Utilities technical 
efficiency was considered in light of the main service-expanding objective of the urban water 
sector in Uganda.  
 
Relative to the accessible water distribution technology across both WU-groups, the (i) 
public-public owned utilities produced more (78 percent) potentially attainable output given 
existing inputs, while (ii) the public-private owned utilities produced much fewer outputs (64 
percent) relative to the potentially attainable outputs given existing resources available to 
utilities within the group. This implies that, both WU-groups can potentially increase their 
output, given existing input resources by 22 (for the public-public owned) and 36 (for the 
public-private owned) percent, relative to their respective best-practice frontiers. The public-
public (compared to the public-private) group frontier was found much closer to the overall 
urban water sector best practice frontier (defined by the metafrontier). This dwindled 
technology gap can be explained by the additional NWSC’s self-monitoring of WUs under its 
mandate. Such creates (and retains) inter-group competitive pressures that eventually 
transform into enhanced group performance.  
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The public-public (than public-private) managerial ownership arrangement was found 
significantly and positively linked to increased utilities’ technical efficiency. This was 
positively influenced by increased market penetration (capture) in terms of increased active 
water connections per utilities’ target population. Indeed under a public-public (than a public-
private) arrangement, investments are more directly linked to service provision. Such 
facilitates water works expansion (and maintenance) to new governmental, residential and 
industrial buildings. Nonetheless, since procured private operators under the public-private 
arrangement only (often) manage existing assets, maintenance operations (than network 
expansion) for existing customers are foremost prioritized.  
  
Nonetheless, the technology gap especially across the public-private owned utilities was 
found to decline overtime. Such decline is attributable to the increased performance-based 
regulation advanced across the public-private owned WUs in particular, by the government. 
Such initiative among others, could eventually help bridge any technology gaps between the 
groups and especially, for utilities found to operate under an IRS region. 
 
Overall, while managerial ownership matters in explaining WUs technical efficiency 
overtime, the underlying institutional (such as sector regulation - see for instance Cook, 1999; 
Bognetti and Obermann, 2008), political and environmental factors conjointly influence 
utilities productivity. More over, the public sector provides water services to more than 90 
percent of the world’s population (WHO and UNICEF, 2000; Prasad, 2006). As is the case in 
most developed economies (Checchi, et al., 2009), the public sector will likely continue to 
dominate  the  African  urban  water  industry  (as  asset  owner,  service  provider  or  both)  in  the  
foreseeable future (Bayliss and McKinley, 2007; Castro, 2008). It is imperative therefore to 
strengthen public sector capabilities (investment, regulation, provision etc) as a development 
policy solution for inclusive quality water services access among other basic public utility 
services in Uganda and Africa in general.  
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Annex 1: Earlier studies on the role of ownership on urban water supply utilities efficiency  
Authors Data (period, place) Technique Variables Significant (in)efficiency determinants 
Private rather than publicly-owned urban water utilities are more (significantly) efficient 
Crain & Zardkoodi, 1978 112: 88 public, 24 private (1970, North America) CD prod function 3 inputs (C); 1 output (Q) Capital, labor and OPEX overuse 
Crain & Zardkoohi, 1980 78 (1970, North America) Multiple regression 3 inputs (C); 2 output (Q), 1 Z Salary incentives and lower operating costs 
Raffiee, et al., 1993 112: 238 public, 33 private (1989, North America) CD cost function 4 inputs (C); 1 output (Q) Property rights attenuation 
Bhattacharyya, et al., 1995 221: 190 public, 31 private (1992,  North America ) Translog cost function 4 inputs (C); 2 outputs (Q); 10 Z  Customer diversification & scale of operation 
Estache & Kouassi, 2002 21: 18 public, 3 private (1995-97, Africa) CD prod function  3 inputs (Q); 1 output (Q); 3 Z Corruption & sector governance 
Bitran & Valenzuela, 2003 13: 8 public, 5 private (1998-2001,  Chile ) PI 2 inputs (CQ); 3 outputs (Q); 1 Z Private equity, economies of scale 
Moreira, et al., 2005 148: 135 public, 13 private (2002,  Brazil ) CD prod function 2 inputs (Q); 1 output (Q) Capital and labor overuse 
Andrés, et al., 2008 49 (15 years, 8 LA countries) Econometric  3 inputs (Q); 3 outputs (Q); 3 Z Water losses,  services continuity and reliability 
Gassner, et al., 2009 977: 836 public, 141 private (1973-2005, LA & Cb) Regression & DD 1 inputs (Q); 5 outputs (Q); 3 Z Labor productivity & daily water supply hours 
Picazo-Tadeo, et al., 2009 34: 8 public, 26 private (2001, Spain) DEA 4 inputs (Q); 3 outputs (Q); 5 Z Labor productivity & density economies 
Correia & Marques, 2011 68: 14 public, 23 private, 31 SA (2004-05, Portugal) Translog cost function 4 inputs (C); 2 outputs (CQ); 5 Z Scale and scope economies 
     Public rather than privately-owned urban water utilities are more (significantly) efficient 
Lynk, 1993 10 private (1979/80 to 1987/88, United Kingdom) Multiproduct cost function 3inputs (C); 3 output (Q); 2 Z Joint service production 
Bhattacharyya, et al., 1994 257: 225 public, 32 private (1992,  North America ) TGV cost function 3inputs (C); 1 output (Q); 2 Z Excessive capitalization 
Shaoul, 1997 10 private (1985-1999, England and Wales) Accounting techniques 3 inputs (CQ); 3 outputs (CQ) Decreased technological change 
Saal & Parker, 2000 10 private (1985-1999, England and Wales) Translog cost function 2 inputs (C); 2 outputs (Q); 2 Z Price-cap regulation & economies of scope 
Saal & Parker, 2001 10 private (1985-1999, England and Wales) Tornqvist indexes 5 inputs (CQ); 1 output (Q) Decreased TFP growth but high economic profits 
Estache & Trujillo, 2003 4 PR: 1 public, 3 private (1999-2001, Argentina) Tornqvist indexes  3 inputs (CQ); 2 outputs (C) Information symmetry  
Saal, et al., 2007 10 private (1985-2000, England and Wales) GPP index 3 inputs (CQ); 4 outputs (Q); 4 Z Undue operation scale, technical economic losses 
Marques, 2008 70 (1994-2001, Portugal)* PI, TFP and DEA 2 inputs (CQ); 2 outputs (Q); 4 Z Investment costs and outsourcing 
Souza, et al., 2008 342: 324 public, 18 private (2002-2004, Brazil) CD cost function 1 input (C); 2 outputs (C); 4 Z Population density & water treatment 
     No significant  efficiency difference between public and privately-owned urban water utilities  
Feigenbaum & Teeples, 1983 319: 262 public, 57 private (1970,  North America ) Hedonic cost function 3 inputs (C); 6 output (Q) High labor, energy and purchased water costs 
Hausman, et al., 1986 64: 32 public, 32 private (1899,  North America ) Ordinary Least Squares 7 inputs (CQ); 3 output (CQ) Rates of return 
Byrnes, et al., 1986 127: 68 public, 59 private (1976,  North America ) Linear programming 7 inputs (Q); 1 output (Q) Scale of operation 
Teeples & Gyler, 1987 119: 67 public, 52 private (1980,  North America ) Dual cost function 8 inputs (C); 1 output (Q); 8 Z Model mis-specifications 
Lambert, et al., 1993 270: 238 public, 32 private ( North America ) DEA 4 inputs (Q); 1 output (Q) Capital, labor, energy and material overuse 
Estache & Rossi, 2002 50: 30 public, 20 private (1995, Asia and Pacific) CD cost function 1 input (C); 3 outputs (CQ); 4 Z High labor costs and low coverage and service  
Saal & Parker, 2004 10 private (1985-1999, England and Wales) PIN, Translog cost function 5 inputs (CQ); 1 output (Q) High labor productivity growth 
Kirkpatrick, et al., 2006 14, out of 110 (2000, Africa) DEA, CD cost function 3 inputs (C); 2 outputs (Q); 7 Z Regulation, but not significant 
Souza, et al., 2007 164: 149 public, 15 private (2002, Brazil) Translog cost function 2 inputs (C); 1 output (C); 5 Z Cost (in) efficiency 
* based on the DEA models; C = cost vectors; Q = quantity vectors; CQ = both cost and quantity vectors; Z’s = environmental variables, CD = Cobb-Douglas;  prod = production; LA = Latin America; Cb = Caribbean; RE = random effects, FE = fixed effects; DD = 
difference-in-difference based on the propensity score nearest-neighbour matching;  SA = semi autonomous; TGV= Translog generalized variable; PR = provincial regulated water operators;  OPEX = operating costs; PI = performance indicators; TFP = total factor 
productivity; GPP = generalized parametric productivity; PIN = Price index numbers 
 
The UNU‐MERIT WORKING Paper Series 
 
2011-01 Mitigating  'anticommons' harms to research  in science and technology by Paul A. 
David 
2011-02 Telemedicine  and  primary  health:  the  virtual  doctor  project  Zambia  by  Evans 
Mupela, Paul Mustard and Huw Jones 
2011-03 Russia's  emerging multinational  companies amidst  the global  economic  crisis by 
Sergey Filippov 
2011-04 Assessment of Gender Gap in Sudan by Samia Satti Osman Mohamed Nour 
2011-05 Assessment  of  Effectiveness  of  China Aid  in  Financing Development  in  Sudan  by 
Samia Satti Osman Mohamed Nour 
2011-06 Assessment  of  the  Impacts  of  Oil:  Opportunities  and  Challenges  for  Economic 
Development in Sudan by Samia Satti Osman Mohamed Nour 
2011-07 Labour Market and Unemployment in Sudan by Samia Satti Osman Mohamed Nour 
2011-08 Social impacts of the development of science, technology and innovation indicators 
by Fred Gault 
2011-09 User innovation and the market by Fred Gault 
2011-10 Absorptive  capacity  in  technological  learning  in  clean  development  mechanism 
projects by Asel Doranova, Ionara Costa and Geert Duysters 
2011-11 Microeconomic analysis of  rural nonfarm activities  in  the Kyrgyz Republic: What 
determines participation and returns? By Aziz Atamanov and Marrit van den Berg 
2011-12 Immigration  and  growth  in  an  ageing  economy  by  Joan  Muysken  and  Thomas 
Ziesemer 
2011-13 State‐led  technological  development:  A  case  of  China's  nanotechnology 
development by Can Huang and Yilin Wu 
2011-14 A historical perspective on immigration and social protection in the Netherlands by 
Melissa Siegel and Chris de Neubourg 
2011-15 Promoting return and circular migration of the highly skilled by Metka Hercog and 
Melissa Siegel 
2011-16 Voluntary agreements and community development as CSR in innovation strategies 
by Vivekananda Mukherjee and Shyama V. Ramani 
2011-17 Strengthening the roles of political parties in Public Accountability ‐ A case study of 
a new approach in political party assistance by Renée Speijcken 
2011-18 The  elusive  quest  for  the  golden  standard:  Concepts,  policies  and  practices  of 
accountability in development cooperation by Renée Speijcken 
2011-19 Are  health  care  payments  in  Albania  catastrophic?  Evidence  form  ALSMS  2002, 
2005 and 2008 by Sonila Tomini and Truman G. Packard 
2011-20 On  India's  plunge  into  Nanotechnology:  What  are  good  ways  to  catch‐up?  By 
Shyama V. Ramani, Nupur Chowdhury, Roger Coronini and Susan Reid 
2011-21 Emerging  country  MNEs  and  the  role  of  home  countries:  separating  fact  from 
irrational expectations by Rajneesh Narula and Quyen T.K. Nguyen 
2011-22 Beyond knowledge brokerage: An exploratory study of innovation intermediaries in 
an  evolving  smallholder  agricultural  system  in  Kenya  by  Catherine  W.  Kilelu, 
Laurens Klerkx, Cees Leeuwis and Andy Hall 
2011-23 Dynamics of biosciences regulation and opportunities for biosciences innovation in 
Africa: Exploring regulatory policy brokering by Ann Kingiri and Andy Hall 
2011-24 The when and where of  research  in agricultural  innovation  trajectories: Evidence 
and  implications  from RIU's  South Asia projects by Vamsidhar Reddy,  T.S., Andy 
Hall and Rasheed Sulaiman V. 
2011-25 Innovation and Diffusion of Clean/Green Technology: Can Patent Commons Help? 
By Bronwyn H. Hall and Christian Helmers 
2011-26 Technology  alliances  in  emerging  economies:  Persistence  and  interrelation  in 
European firms' alliance formation By Rene Belderbos, Victor Gilsing, Jojo Jacob 
2011-27 Innovation  pathways  and  policy  challenges  at  the  regional  level:    smart 
specialization By René Wintjes  and Hugo Hollanders 
2011-28 Innovation and productivity by Bronwyn H. Hall 
2011-29 Mapping  the  interdisciplinary  nature  and  co‐evolutionary  patterns  in  five  nano‐
industrial sectors by Lili Wang and Ad Notten 
2011-30 Assessment  of  industrial  performance  and  the  relationship  between  skill, 
technology and  input‐output  indicators  in Sudan by Samia Satti Osman Mohamed 
Nour 
2011-31 Assessment of skill and technology indicators at the macro‐micro levels in Sudan by 
Samia Satti Osman Mohamed Nour 
2011-32 Education, training and skill development policies in Sudan: Macro‐micro overview 
by Samia Satti Osman Mohamed Nour 
2011-33 Estimating  the  rate  of  return  to  education  in  Sudan  by  Samia  Satti  Osman 
Mohamed Nour 
2011-34 The  importance  (impact)  of  knowledge  at  the  macro‐micro  levels  in  Sudan  by 
Samia Satti Osman Mohamed Nour 
2011-35 Angus Maddison and Development Economics by Adam Szirmai 
2011-36 Managerial  ownership  and  urban water  utilities  efficiency  in Uganda  by Dorcas 
Mbuvi and Achraf Tarsim 
